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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF UNITED
STATES DEEP SEABED MINING
SCOTT C. WHITNEY *
Seaward of the continental margin in the area generally known as
the deep seabed are extensive deposits of manganese nodules contain-
ing over twenty metallic elements. Five of these elements are of vital
importance to world industry: nickel, copper, cobalt, manganese, and
molybdenum. Recently, several companies from the United States and
elsewhere have developed the extremely expensive technology nec-
essary to recover manganese nodules from the sea bottom. Recovery
and production are certain to occur between now and 1980 if secure
legal arrangements are achieved, either through an agreement in the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS) negotia-
tions I or by unilateral United States action. In fact, several com-
panies already have dredged nodules in substaytial quantity, and at
least two successful procedures for extracting rfetal from the nodules
* A.B., University of Nevada; J.D., Harvard University. Professor of Law,
College of William and Mary. The author wishes to thank James R. Cox and
Robert W. Emmett, third year law students at the College of William and Mary,
for their valuable assistance in researching and drafting this article.
1. The purpose of this analysis is not to consider directly what regulatory and
environmental provisions should be adopted by the ongoing LOS negotiations but
rather to propose the regulatory and environmental provisions that the United
States should implement in the likely event the LOS discussions become pro-
tracted, causing the United States and other countries possessing the technology
to undertake unilateral deep-sea mining programs. Of course, many of the neces-
sary environmental precautions probably would be imposed whether an LOS-
developed entity or an individual state regulatory body did the regulating. The
assumption that at least for an interim period deep-sea mining will be conducted
on a unilateral basis is predicated on the following history of the LOS negotia-
tions, which to date have shown little prospect for prompt resolution of the issue.
The third LOS Conference was held initially at the United Nations head-
quarters in December, 1973. That meeting was devoted to matters of procedure
and organization. The second session, during which the substantive issues first
were discussed, opened on June 20, 1974, in Caracas, Venezuela, and continued
for ten weeks. Geneva hosted the third session from March 17 to May 9, 1975. The
fourth session was held in New York from March 15 to May 7, 1976; there a dis-
pute over the critical issue of deep seabed mining arose between the industrialized
nations and the developing countries of the world, the so-called Group of 77 (now
more than 115 nations). At the session's conclusion, the question of whether
private and state companies were to be given access to the minerals of the seabed
prior to the adoption of an LOS agreement remained unresolved. This impasse
continued through the fifth and sixth sessions, held in New York during the fall
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have been tested in pilot plants. 2 Although the requisite technology
for deep-sea mining is available, no one fully understands the environ-
mental implications of mining the ocean floor. What is certain is that,
as with every action man undertakes, the mining of manganese
nodules will have some effect on the oceans' environment.
At present there is no formal regulatory process that must be satis-
fied to conduct deep-sea mining. Mining companies, of course, must
comply with existing laws and regulations relating to export control,
customs, taxes, trade, maritime activities, and occupational safety
and health. To meet the environmental and regulatory problems in-
herent in such a massive commercial venture, however, Congress
must enact legislation that encourages exploitation of the oceans'
natural resources according to sound economic and environmental
principles. This Article examines the nature of deepseabed mining
and proposes a legislative framework within which these ventures can
operate effectively. The Article then discusses the problems this
country will confront while attempting to promote the responsible
development of deep-sea mining in a hostile international environ-
ment.
NODULE MINING AND PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY
A typical mining operation involves two fundamental steps: re-
covery and processing. Three basic recovery systems presently are
being considered for manganese nodule mining: air-lift pumping,
hydraulic dredging, and continuous line bucket dredging. Air-lift
pumping (ALP), or pneumatic lift dredging, involves a three-phase
flow of air, water, and nodules. Compressed air is injected into a pipe
at various depths to force water, the nodules, and the surrounding
sediment into the bottom end of the pipe. The flow of water and air
helps to vacuum the nodules off the seabed and carry them up the
pipe to be deposited in the mining ship above. 3 Hydraulic, or hydro-
of 1976 and the spring of 1977 respectively. As a result of the combination of new
unilateral ocean claims with the lasting stalemate, the prospects of reaching an
expedited future agreement are unlikely. At the conclusion of the sixth session,
Ambassador Richardson testified he would recommend to the President that the
United States "consider whether an agreement acceptable to all governments
could be achieved through the kind of negotiations which have thus far taken
place." Statement of Ambassador Richardson, at 14 before the Subcomm. on
Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 26, 1977) (unpublished transcript).
2. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, REPORT ON DEEP SEABED
HARD MINERALS ACT, S. REP. No. 754, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
3. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 1ST. SESS., OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES 15-16
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES].
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lift, dredging is similar to ALP, but it relies entirely on pumped
water to provide an upward flow through the pipe. 4 Continuous line
bucket (CLB) dredging, a simpler technique, utilizes a long continu-
ous rope to which dredge buckets are attached. As the surface ship
moves sideways, the loop of the dredge buckets is dragged across the
ocean bottom, scraping up the nodules.5
Once brought to the surface, the nodules are prepared for the pro-
cessing, extracting, and refining of the minerals. This may occur
either at sea or on land. Because the composition of manganese nodules
differs from that of any commercially mined land-based mineral de-
posit, the customary methods of extracting metals do not work. Gen-
erally, chemical leaching or hydrometallurgical techniques are con-
sidered the most commercially feasible methods of nodule processing.,
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS OF DEEP-SEA MINING
Several investigations have been conducted to determine the nature
of the environmental impact of manganese nodule mining. In 1970,
at the invitation of Deepsea Ventures, Inc., a group of marine
scientists under the direction of Dr. Oswald A. Roels of the Lamont-
Doherty Geological Observatory observed a pilot ALP mining test
near the Blake Plateau in the Atlantic." In 1972 investigators sup-
ported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) monitored a test of the CLB mining system in the North
Pacific." Neither of the investigations reported significant adverse
environmental effects. 9 Nevertheless, others have warned that seabed
mining will produce a broad spectrum of significant environmental
disturbances. 10 Although industry minimizes the impact of deep-sea
mining and the United States government has not coordinated the
4. Id. at 18.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 20.
7. Id. at 27. See also Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources: Hearings on H.R.
13076, H.R. 13904, and H.R. 14918 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 123-25
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 13076].
8. OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 27.
9. Id. According to Dr. Roels: "Provided the mining operation is conducted
intelligently, then the discharged deep sea mining effluent would not represent an
environmental hazard." Hearings on H.R. 13076, supra, note 7, at 138.
10. Deep Seabed Mining: Hearings on H.R. 1270, H.R. 6017, and H.R.
11879 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 554-55 (1976) (testimony of Jonathan
I. Charney). See also Frank, Environmental Aspects of Deepsea Mining, 15 VA. J.
INT'L L. 815 (1975).
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available data and analytical information, research to date has raised
a number of environmental questions concerning both the ocean min-
ing site and the processing plant location.
Ocean Site Concerns
Both the ALP and hydrolift systems transport nodules, sediment,
and deep water to the surface; the CLB system is designed to bring
only nodules to the surface, but in actuality some sediment may be
entrapped and later dispersed throughout the water column. The dis-
charge of sediment lifted from the ocean floor will create a dark
"plume" of red clay over a large area of the ocean surface, which may
cause a stimulation of photosynthetic activity and productivity, re-
sulting in a phytoplankton bloom." The discharged particulate ma-
terial also may alter light penetration and reduce photosynthetic
activity in lower layers. At present the effect of this is unknbwn; some
have even suggested that it may be beneficial, or at least irrelevant.12
The operation of either the suction or bucket systems also will
disturb the biological activity and sediment on the ocean bottom.
Although present techniques are not 100% efficient in bottom cover-
age, scientists are concerned not only by the ability of bottom organ-
isms to repopulate a mined area but also by the potential destruction
of an entire species.' 3 In addition, bottom sediments that are stirred
up by a mining operation may clog or smother benthic (bottom
dwelling) organisms over a much wider area than that actually
mined, thus further jeopardizing the reestablishment of the bottom
ecosystem.' 4 The suspension of lifted sediments in the water column
also may cause the transplantation of spores or other dormant forms
of organisms from one area to another, where favorable temperature,
light, and oxygen conditions in the overlying water may reactivate
them.' 5 Similarly, alien antibodies may be set free from the ancient
spores and organisms contained in the sediment that is removed from
the floor, infecting animal and plant life in an "Andromeda Strain"
scenario.' 6
Processing Site Concerns
Although most major companies involved in the development of
manganese nodule mining have determined that processing will occur
11. Frank, supra note 10, at 815, 817-18.
12. OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 28-29.
13. Frank, supra note 10, at 810-19.
14. OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 28.
15. Id.
16. Frank, supra note 10, at 820.
[Vol. 19:77
SEABED MINING REGULATION
ashore, shipboard processing may be economically attractive in the
future. Highly pollutive chemicals with heavy alkaline and acid bases
are used in the processing of the nodules, and if the methods are not
self-contained, wastes or residues could produce a severe strain on
the ecosystem in the mining area.17 Regardless of where the processing
takes place, the disposal of waste, including manganese tracings, will
create a potential environmental harm, the impact of which has not
been evaluated fully. Assuming that the nodules are not processed at
sea, extractive plants near the shoreline probably will be developed,
thus increasing the chance that mining operations will have an ad-
verse impact on the coastal zone. Moreover, the energy requirements
of mining systems are substantial, and new energy sources need to be
developed in either the coastal zone or at sea. The use of nuclear power
would pose certain risks; 18 if other energy modes are employed, then
different environmental problems will be encountered.
Clearly, the orderly development of deep-sea mining requires a
regime of law that addresses both the regulatory and environmental
aspects of this activity. Because the areas containing known com-
mercial quantities of nodules are located seaward of the limits of the
national resources jurisdictions that are recognized by international
law, the ongoing sessions of the LOS Conference undoubtedly will
continue their attempts to formulate an acceptable international
regime with which to govern the regulatory and environmental mat-
ters. Meanwhile, pending the adoption of an international agreement,
two bills have been introduced in the 95th Congress to promote the
orderly development of hard mineral resources in the deep seabed. 19
These bills, however, present fundamentally different regulatory ap-
proaches to the problem.
17. Id. at 819.
18. Id. at 820.
19. H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("Deep Seabed Hard Minerals
Act") [hereinafter referred to textually as the Murphy bill]; H.R. 3652, 95th
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1977) ("Ocean Mining Incentive Act of 1977") [hereinafter
referred to textually as the Fraser bill].
The Murphy bill has been amended substantially by the House Subcommittee on
Oceanography. Moreover, three bills have been introduced in the Senate. S. 2053,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S13,924 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977); S. 2085,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S14,688 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1977) ; S. 2168,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S16,046 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1977). This
study does not undertake to evaluate the various versions but rather to determine,
using the Murphy and Fraser bills as points of departure, which regulatory and
environmental provisions should be adopted by the Congress to control deep-sea
mining.
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REGULATORY OPTIONS
The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act,20 introduced by Representa-
tive Murphy of New York, recognizes that America's mineral needs
will continue to expand beyond domestic sources of supply, the na-
tional interest requires an access to strategic minerals independent
of the export policies of foreign nations, and the adverse impact on
the country's balance-of-payments caused by the purchase of foreign
minerals must be avoided. 21 Because abundant deposits of manganese
nodules exist in the seabed of international waters and American
companies are developing the technology to exploit this resource, the
Murphy bill emphasizes that it is in the national interest to encourage
the perfection of this technology by enacting interim legislation that
creates a licensing program to insure the security of deep-sea mining
investments. 22
Although the Murphy bill styles itself as "interim legislation" and
leaves the door open to supersession when and if an LOS agreement is
ratified, 23 it grants qualifying mining companies exclusive licenses
to designated blocks or areas of the deep seabed measuring as much
as sixty thousand square kilometers. 24 Moreover, qualifying companies
would receive a ten-year exploration period and, if commercial re-
covery "has begun from a licensed block within the ten-year period,
such license shall remain in force for as long as commercial recovery
from the block continues with reasonable diligence, as determined
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to
section 16." 25 Actual commercial recovery may not begin prior to
January 1, 1978; after that date, the mining operations may not occur
until the licensee obtains a commercial recovery permit.26 At the time
of issuance of the permit or ten years from the license date, whichever
is sooner, the licensee must relinquish those portions of his choice of
the original block in an amount necessary to reduce the licensed area
to no more than thirty thousand square kilometers. 27
20. H.R. 3350, supra note 19.
21. Id. § 2(a).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 5(b) (4).
24. Id. § 3 (4).
25. Id. § 5 (b) (7). The licensing system of the Murphy bill is somewhat similar
to the licensing system structured by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
which provides for a five-year exploration period and a life-of-the-field production
period. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1970).
26. H.R. 3350, supra note 19, § 9 (a).
27. Id. § 11.
[Vol. 19:77
SEABED MINING REGULATION
One of the key provisions of the Act provides that when there is a
transition to an international regime that is binding on the United
States,
[t] o the extent that the provisions of the international re-
gime permit, the United States shall sponsor applications
from licensees under this Act for licenses under the inter-
national regime and shall insure, to the maximum extent
possible, that such licensees receive the same rights, and have
the same duties, under the international regime as are pro-
vided under this Act.28
Thus, licensees would receive substantial "grandfather rights" under
the Murphy bill. Because an international regime would become bind-
ing on the United States only after being ratified by the Senate and
signed by the President, the United States probably would not agree
to any regime that did not permit it to sponsor its existing licensees
for equivalent rights under the international structure. Furthermore,
the Murphy bill provides that if the United States approves an agree-
ment which produces "an actual, measurable loss of investment" for
any licensee, the licensee will receive compensation computed by a
federal district court pursuant to the criteria established in section
13 (b) .29 If the licensee has not received his commercial recovery per-
mit, he is compensated for his investment losses occurring before the
date of supersession; if the licensee has obtained a commercial re-
covery permit, his compensation is expanded to enable him to recover
the "loss of investment in equipment and facilities utilized for com-
mercial recovery and processing of deep seabed minerals." 30 In no
event can a licensee recover research, testing, or evaluation costs, and
the eligibility for any compensation terminates ten years after the
issuance of a permit for commercial recovery.31
The Ocean Mining Incentive Act of 1977,32 introduced by Represen-
tative Fraser of Minnesota, presents a substantially different legal
and conceptual framework to govern the deep-sea mining efforts of
American companies. Rather than emphasizing national mineral self-
sufficiency, balance-of-payments considerations, and the need to expe-
dite commercial production, the Fraser bill stresses the global (as well
as national) interest in exploiting the deep seabed under the aegis of
an international treaty produced by the LOS Conference. An LOS
treaty would insure, among other things, the world-wide distribution
28. Id. § 12.
29. Id. § 13.
30. Id. § 13 (a).
31. Id. § 13(a), (c).
32. H.R. 3652, supra note 19.
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of deep-sea mining benefits and "enhance[d] development of the
common heritage of mankind." 33 Thus the Fraser bill does not under-
take to provide a regulatory process or format for deep-sea mining 34
but rather a "transitional" process that will not threaten LOS negotia-
tions.3 5 The bill acknowledges the need to provide incentive to mining
firms to continue developing the requisite technology, that is, to pro-
ceed with "prototype experimentation" " until July 1, 1980, and upon
expiration of the Act, absent an LOS treaty, to provide the participat-
ing mining firms "with the necessary further incentives for actual
commercial recovery of mineral-bearing nodules from the deep
seabed." 37
To this end an ocean mining incentive program would provide
federal insurance to mining firms during the prototype phase. 3s Two
kinds of loss would be covered: loss or damage from physical inter-
ference or sabotage by persons "against whom a legal remedy does
not exist or is unavailable in any legal forum to which any such
mining firm has access" or "any loss of continuity of operations
resulting from significant change in the international status of the
deep seabed area." 39 The insurance coverage would not exceed
$100,000,000 40 and would be available only if the program's Director
determined that coverage was not available elsewhere at a reasonable
33. Id. § 2(a). The bill declares its purposes to include, inter alia, support for
the work of the LOS Conference and encouragement of a timely agreement on a
treaty. Id. § 3 (a) (1). For the text of this provision see note 35 infra.
34. The bill provides: "[I]f agreement is not reached at the Law of the Sea
Conference, legislation should be enacted which establishes a more comprehensive
legal regime for the commercial recovery of nodule resources after July 1, 1980."
Id. § 13 (3).
35. Id. § 3(a) (1). This section provides: "It is therefore declared to he the
purposes of the Congress in this Act-(1) to support the work of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and to encourage timely agree-
ment on a treaty." In addition, § 13 provides:
The Congress hereby expresses-
(1) its support for United States participation in the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea; and (2) its intention that this
Act be considered to be supportive of the objectives of the Conference,
in that this Act, in anticipation of agreement being reached at the
Conference, allows United States mining firms to proceed toward ocean
mining capability without rupturing the negotiations process.
Id. § 13.
36. Id. § 2 (a) (5).
37. Id. § 3(a) (3).
38. Id. § 6(a).
39. Id. § 6(b) (1).
40. Id. § 6(b) (2) (A).
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cost.41 The amount of any claim would be determined by a panel com-
posed of equal numbers of government employees from the Office of
Ocean Mining Incentives and the Department of the Interior.42 If,
after a joint review of the panel decision by the Secretaries of Com-
merce and the Interior, 43 the mining company disagrees with the
Government's disposition of its claim, it must resort to a federal dis-
trict court within two years after the decision of the Secretaries.4 4
The Fraser bill's insurance protection would be available only to
companies qualifying as eligible mining firms. To qualify, section 5 (b)
requires that a business apply to the Director of the Office of Mining
Incentives, which the bill would place within NOAA. 45 The applicant
must demonstrate the ability to engage in prototype operations
through evidence of experience, financial capacity, and access to
technology and data.46 Among the factors the Director is to weigh
in determining eligibility are evidence that the firm has engaged in
research and development in nodule resource mining for at least five
years, has spent at least $20,000,000 on such research and develop-
ment, and will locate processing facilities in places subject to the
jurisdiction of a state or the United States.47
From a regulatory standpoint the only common ground between the
two bills is that both purport to encourage the continued progress in
United States deep-sea mining pending the outcome of the LOS negoti-
ations. Obviously the Murphy bill provides significantly more incen-
tive. Indeed, the Fraser bill provides no meaningful incentive what-
soever. Those few firms that can qualify for eligibility only receive
insurance with obscure coverage, unknown cost, and a collection pro-
cedure that is entrusted to a bureaucratic process of undetermined
length, which must be exhausted before the claimant may avail him-
self of a judicial remedy. In addition, absent passage of an LOS treaty
by the end of the prototype phase, an eligible mining firm is given only
the nebulous assurance that Congress will provide United States min-
ing firms with the necessary incentives to promote the commercializa-
tion of the deep-sea mining industry.4 This assurance, however, is
placed among the "Purposes" rather than in the substantive provisions
of the bill and clearly is not binding on a subsequent Congress. More-
over, the Fraser bill provides no incentive to pioneering mining firms
41. Id. § 6(b) (2) (C).
42. Id. § 6 (b) (4) (A).
43. Id. § 6(b) (5).
44. Id. § 6(b) (6).
45. Id. § 5(a) (1)-(b) (1).
46. Id. § 5 (b) (2).
47. Id. § 5(b) (2) (A)-(C).
48. Id. § 3 (a) (3).
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in the event that an LOS treaty is forthcoming. In fact, given the
language espousing the worldwide distribution of deep-sea mining
benefits to enhance mankind's common heritage,4 9 the Fraser bill
might act as a disincentive. Thus, of the two proposals, the Murphy
bill is the only regulatory option that provides a workable interim pro-
cess and establishes, in the event an LOS treaty is not ratified, an
ongoing, viable regulatory framework. Further, if an LOS treaty is
forthcoming, the Murphy bill provides a mechanism for transition to
an international regime that either protects the lessees' equities or,
failing that, provides a compensation scheme for investments made
before the leases are modified or abrogated.
OPTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
Like man's activities in the stratosphere and outer space, the en-
vironmental consequences of his activities in the benthonic regions are
largely unknown. Accordingly, the first and most critical element in
formulating an adequate environmental protection process for deep-
sea mining is an expedited program to assess the environmental im-
pacts that will result at each stage of the proposed mining, transport-
ing, and processing operations. Such an assessment is essential to
identify unavoidable impacts, damage mitigation strategies, and al-
ternatives of proposed measures for each level of operations. A com-
prehensive analysis is also necessary to determine the short- and
long-term cost-benefit ratios of the various alternatives and those re-
sources that will be irretrievably committed in a prospective program.
Similarly, an environmental assessment of deep-sea mining in all of its
various phases is necessary before federal decision-makers can under-
take a meaningful analysis in compliance with the National Environ-
mental Policy.Act of 1969 (NEPA).50
Both the Murphy and Fraser bills recognize the need for environ-
mental protection, but the Murphy bill does not require an environ-
mental assessment program.51 For example, section 7(a) of the
Murphy bill provides that "the Secretary may conduct any necessary
research for the purpose of acquiring necessary information to es-
tablish such [environmental] criteria and standards and may, from
time to time, revise the criteria and standards as scientific data may
49. Id. § 2(a) (3)-(4). See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
51. The Murphy bill, H.R. 3350, supra note 19, contains six references to en-
vironmental protection: §§ 2(a) (9), 5(a) (4), 5(b), 7, 8(b), and 9(b); the Fraser
bill, H.R. 3652, supra note 19, contains three references to environmental protec-
tion: §§ 2(a) (6), 3(a) (4), and 7.
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warrant." 52 If the Secretary does conduct research, then, with the
consent of the head of the agency concerned, he "may avail himself
of such officers and employees, advice, information, laboratories, ves-
sels, and other facilities of any federal agency as may be helpful in the
conduct of such research." 53 In contrast, section 2(a) (6) of the Fraser
bill recognizes that: "The environmental effect of deep seabed mining
is not fully understood and therefore in the interest of full compliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act, as well as facilitating the
normal industry development, it is important that a program of en-
vironmental assessment of deep sea mining be accelerated." 54 Ac-
cordingly, the Fraser bill further provides in section 7 (a): "The Ad-
ministrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
shall accelerate the program of environmental assessment of deep
seabed mining with a view to ascertaining the environmental impact
of such mining, including associated retrieval and land-based pro-
cessing, at the earliest possible time." 55
Under NEPA, this assessment must be completed prior to any irre-
versible or irretrievable resource commitment to insure the avail-
ability of data essential to the preparation of a meaningful and legally
sufficient Environmental Impact Statement.56 Without the essential
baseline data provided by a comprehensive scientific analysis, federal
agencies cannot reasonably consider any of the environmental ques-
tions that the law requires them to analyze.Y Stripped of basic back-
ground material, any Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) would
lack meaningful content, and a subsequent EIS when the mining com-
pany seeks its commercial production permit, as is required by the
Murphy bill,58 would be open to judicial attack as merely a post hoc
justification of an accomplished fact.
Both the Murphy and Fraser bills specifically provide for com-
pliance with NEPA. Under the Murphy bill, however, the totality of
52. H.R. 3350, supra note 19, § 7(a) (emphasis supplied).
53. Id. § 7(b) (emphasis supplied).
54. H.R. 3652, supra note 19, § 2(a) (6).
55. Id. § 7 (a) (emphasis supplied). In addition, one of the enumerated purposes
of the bill is "to accelerate a program of environmental assessment of deep sea
mining and to insure the establishment of needed environmental regulation .
Id. § 3 (a) (4).
56. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted on other issues, 97 S. Ct.
1098 (1977); Council on Environmental Quality, Preparation of Environmental
Impact Statements: Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
CEQ Guidelines].
57. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
58. H.R. 3350, supra note 19, § 9 (b).
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environmental protection consists of a requirement to prepare a
NEPA EIS 9 and a vesting of the secretary with the discretionary
authority to institute the type of research program discussed earlier. °
The Fraser bill, in section 7 (b), specifically provides that the Adminis-
trator of NOAA shall accelerate the preparation of a general program-
matic EIS within one year from the effective date of the Act and that
similarly, based on appropriate studies, he shall establish within one
year "general criteria for the carrying out of prototype operations
in a manner so as to protect the marine environment." 61 Thereafter,
section 7(c) requires the Administrator, with inter-agency coordina-
tion and assistance, to issue regulations established on the program-
matic EIS and general criteria to protect the marine environment. 2
Even if litigation concerning implementation of the Fraser bill
does not occur, the preparation of an EIS for the section 7 (c) rule-
making and the actual rulemaking itself would consume most, if not
all, of 1979. Thus, only six months would remain before the bill's
expiration date for mining companies to apply for eligibility status
under the bill and prepare a specific EIS for each such designation. 3
Apparently in recognition of this difficulty, section 7(d) provides for
the issuance of interim regulations until the general requirements of
sections 7 (b) and 7 (c) are met. 4 These interim regulations must com-
ply with section 7(c) (3), which requires notice of the nature and ex-
tent of proposed prototype operations, the reporting of actual or po-
tential effects of these activities on the marine environment, and the
presence of a monitoring team from the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) aboard the vessels conducting the prototype opera-
tions.6 5
59. Id. § 5 (b). Apart from this provision, the law clearly requires the prepara-
tion of an EIS for federally authorized operations outside the territorial limits of
the United States. Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973);
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 64 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as CEQ ANALYSIS]. See also Council on Environmental Quality,
Draft Provisions to Implement the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
for Agency Activities Affecting the Environment in Foreign Nations and the
Global Commons (Jan. 11, 1978).
60. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
61. H.R. 3652, supra note 19., § 7 (b).
62. Id. § 7(c).
63. In addition to the programmatic EIS specifically required by § 7 (b), NEPA
clearly requires preparation of a specific EIS for each eligibility designation that
is site-specific. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d
Cir. 1977); CEQ Guidelines, supra note 56, § 1500.6.
64. H.R. 3652, supra note 19, § 7(d).
65. Id. § 7(c) (3).
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It is doubtful that provision for interim regulations cures the timing
problem created by sections 7(b) and 7(c) for two reasons. First, the
bill apparently contemplates the approval of interim operations with-
out the preparation of either a programmatic EIS or a specific EIS
related to particular eligibility designations. As such, the Fraser bill
conflicts with NEPA, which requires the compilation of both types
of statements. 0 Second, section 7 (c) (3), when invoked in the context
of section 7 (d) interim operations, countermands the bill's qualific-
tion requirements for eligibility designations. Thus, instead of the
detailed designation findings generally required by section 5(b) ,07
under the interim regulations an applicant need only give the Admin-
istrator notice of his proposed modus operandi, file reports, and allow
for an EPA monitoring team. Because the completion of the long-
term regulation process would consume most of the contemplated life
of the bill, in practical effect the section 7 (d) interim plan constitutes
the format under which prototype operations will be approved and
conducted, and the remainder of the bill is surplusage. During the
operation of the entire interim program no EIS would be completed.
REGULATORY REGIME
The Fraser bill articulates the important principle that "[t] he ab-
sence of a legal regime constitutes an impediment to deep sea mining
progress by creating investment uncertainty .... 8 6  An effective
regulatory regime must create incentive by providing security. The
Murphy format, with the amendments suggested hereafter, clearly
best meets this criterion. A qualified mining company cannot be ex-
pected to hazard the immense investment that is necessary for the
effective development of a deep-sea mining operation unless it pos-
sesses extraction rights in a specific geographic area and over a
definite period of time to develop its claim and enjoy the fruits of its
efforts.6 9
To insure that qualified licensees will benefit from their invest-
ment and developmental efforts, the regulatory process must guaran-
tee that in the event of an international treaty the rights of licensees
either will be protected or fully compensated. Further, the physical
realities of producing deep-sea mining operations must be recognized.
Given the present state of the art, a ten-year period for developmental
66. See notes 56-58, 63 supra & accompanying text.
67. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
68. H.R. 3652, supra note 19, § 2 (a) (3).
69. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333-1343 (1970),
recognizes the basic equitable and pragmatic necessity for vesting these minimal
rights in private enterprise. See note 25 supra.
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purposes is not unreasonable. The time limitation created by the
expiration date of the Fraser bill by itself renders that proposed
program unacceptable.
Although the regulatory program should vest rights in qualified
licensees, it also must insure that licensees are fit, willing, and able to
perform the development and production required by the national in-
terest. The Murphy bill sets forth five requirements that must be met
by a mining firm before the Secretary may issue a license, only one of
which, financial responsibility, pertains to fitness and ability.70 Other-
wise the Murphy bill delegates to the Secretary the duty to establish
licensing procedures and provides only scant guidelines.7 The inclu-
sion of more specific qualifying provisions such as those enumerated
in section 5(b) of the Fraser bill 72 would improve the Murphy
proposal.
Another desirable component of any regulatory program is the re-
quirement that adequate technical and operational regulations be
forthcoming at each stage of development to insure effectiveness,
70. H.R. 3350, supra note 19, §5, provides in pertinent part:
Before he may issue a license, the Secretary must first determine, in
the consideration of each license application-
(1) that the applicant is financially responsible;
(2) that the activities under the license will not unreasonably
interfere with the rights of other states or persons in their exercise of
the freedoms of the high seas, as recognized under the general princi-
ples of international law;
(3) that the issuance of a license does not conflict with any inter-
national obligation of the United States, established by any treaty or
convention which is ratified by and becomes binding upon the United
States;
(4) that activities under the license will not pose an unreasonable
threat to the integrity of the marine environment and will be con-
ducted in accordance with environmental standards delineated in regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to section 16;
(5) that minerals recovered under authority of the license, to the
extent of the proportionate interest therein of all United States
entities, will be processed in the United States, or on board United
States vessels.
71. Id. § 6(a) provides:
The Secretary is authorized and directed to establish procedures gov-
erning the application for, and the issuance of, licenses pursuant to
this Act. Such procedures shall contain an adequate mechanism for
full consultation with all other interested Federal agencies and de-
partments, and for the full consideration of the views of any interested
members of the general public.
See also id. § 6 (c) (4), which contemplates that the Secretary's regulations will
include the data enumerated in § 6(c) (4) (i)-(iii).
72. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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safety, and continuing environmental protection. National super-
vision over deep-sea mining will necessitate ongoing regulations such
as those presently imposed by the United States Geological Survey
Operating Orders to govern technical aspects of outer continental
shelf projects.7 3 The Murphy bill does not insure that such regulatory
surveillance will occur. Section 6(a) provides that "the Secretary is
authorized and directed to establish procedures governing" licensing
applications and issuances7 4 In contrast, section 16(a), which es-
tablishes the Secretary's regulatory authority, provides only that "the
Secretary is authorized to issue such reasonable rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, including
* . . (4) work requirements and diligence in performance; (5) en-
vironmental criteria and standards; [and] (6) multiple use stand-
ards." 75 Section 16(a) should be amended to conform with section
6(a) and not only authorize but direct the Secretary to issue rules
relating to ongoing technical and operational developments. Similarly,
section 16's enumeration of subject matter should be expanded to
authorize the promulgation of protective provisions comparable to
the United States Geological Survey Operating Orders.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME
As discussed above, effective environmental regulation of deep-sea
mining demands prompt implementation of an expedited but con-
tinuing comprehensive scientific research assessment program whose
results will permit the meaningful preparation of each programmatic
and site-specific licensing EIS. The Murphy bill therefore should be
amended to include the Fraser bill's sections 2 (a) (6), 3 (a) (4), and
7 (a) - (c). Moreover, some lawful interim mechanism must be devised
that satisfies environmental requirements but avoids delay in con-
tinued developmental efforts by United States mining companies. One
solution would be legislation allowing interim operating licenses simi-
lar to the temporary nuclear operating licenses permitted by a 1972
amendment 7 6 to the Atomic Energy Act.7 7 Then, as now, Congress
was concerned with meeting a need of the nation while simultaneously
protecting the quality of the environment. After Calvert Cliffs' Co-
73. Geological Survey, Outer Continental Shelf, 30 C.F.R. § 250.12 (1976)
(promulgated pursuant to §§ 5-6 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1334-1335 (1970)).
74. H.R. 3350, supra note 19, § 6(a) (emphasis supplied).
75. Id. § 16 (a).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2242 (Supp. II 1972).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
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ordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC78 effectively had paralyzed the
Atomic Energy Commission's licensing process, Congress enacted in-
terim legislation to permit the completion of licensing then in pro-
gress. Under the terms of the amendment, if the conditions providing
for the operation of a facility adequately protected the environment
on a short-term basis, then a temporary license could be issued. 79 In
the context of deep-sea mining, Congress could structure abbreviated
environmental requirements to insure that no irreparable damage is
caused by temporary mining operations permitted during the period
necessary to conduct baseline studies, establish criteria, promulgate
regulations, prepare the requisite programmatic EIS. and process each
site-specific licensing application submitted with an EIS.
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIME OF LAW UNTIL AN LOS TREATY IS FORTHCOMING
Even after the development of environmental regulations for
United States mining companies, the problem remains of negotiating
an adequate international environmental regime with other industrial
nations engaged in deep-sea mining operations. The history of in-
ternational accord for effective international environmental controls
suggests that negotiating adequate regulations with those countries
most likely to engage in deep-sea mining will be difficult.A0
Article 145 of the LOS Informal Composite Negotiating Text, deal-
ing with protection of the marine environment, is nothing more than
a generalized policy statement.8 ' Such generality has characterized
78. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2242(b) (2) (Supp. II 1972). This section provides:
(b) With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a) of
this section, the Commission shall issue a temporary operating license
upon finding that:
(2) operation of the facility during the period of the temporary
operating license in accordance with its terms and conditions will pro-
vide adequate protection of the environment during the period of the
temporary operating license ....
80. The foreign nations with the requisite technology, resources, and motivation
that are most likely to embark on deep-sea mining ventures within the next
twenty years are: Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan,
New Zealand, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium. In
addition to either direct or indirect government involvement in mining research,
development, and processing, more than 100 companies around the world are now
engaged in various endeavors to exploit mineral resources from the ocean floor.
OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 37, 55-57.
81. Article 145 provides:
With respect to activities in the Area, necessary measures shall be
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the meetings convened to address international environmental prob-
lems. Nevertheless, one innovative suggestion has been advanced that
is somewhat more specific. Professor Goldie has proposed employing
an international environmental impact statement process modelled
after the NEPA requirements as a basis for an international en-
vironmental regime of law. 2 Goldie's thesis is that in international
law legal doctrines come into being through the emergence of a "rela-
tively specific articulation of the notion of justice," a demand for its
legal implementation, an articulation of the notion in the form of laws
and rules, and finally, its conceptualization into a legal doctrine which
presumably is both intelligible and enforceable.8 3 Goldie concludes that
section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 84
satisfies the criteria for a legal doctrine "because it embodies the re-
ception and legal expression of a deeply held value at large in modern
society." 85
To date, however, no other nation has enacted even for domestic
purposes anything approximating NEPA,8 6 which suggests that the
principles of NEPA fall short of being deeply-held values in modern
society. Indeed, even within the United States as of March, 1976,
despite extensive litigation to compel federal agency compliance, 87
taken in order to ensure effective protection for the marine environ-
ment from harmful effects which may arise from such activities in
accordance with Part XII of the present Convention:
(a) The prevention of pollution and contamination, and other
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and of
interference with the ecological balance of the marine environment,
particular attention being paid to the need for protection from the
consequences of such activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, dis-
posal of waste, construction and operation or maintenance of installa-
tions, pipelines and other devices related to such activities;
(b) The protection and conservation of the natural resources of the
Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the
marine environment.
Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 (1977).
82. L. GOLDIE, INTERNATIONAL IMPACT STATEMENTS AND THE CONSERVATION
OF THE OCEAN ENVIRONMENT IN A DEEP SEABED HARD MINERALS MINING REGIME,
reprinted in Deep Seabed Hard Minerals: Hearings on H.R. 9, H.R. 7732, and
H.R. 12233 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1974).
83. Id. at 12-13.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
85. Id. at 13.
86. See, e.g., Rabie, Disclosure and Evaluation of Potential Environmental
Impact of Proposed Governmental Administrative Action, 1976 TYDSKRIF VIR
HEDENDAAGSE R OMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG. 40.
87. In the first five and one-half years of NEPA enforcement, at least 654 cases
were instituted to compel compliance by federal decision makers. CEQ ANALYSIS,
supra note 59, at 31.
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many agencies' NEPA practices continued either to be legally de-
fective or to fall significantly short of the spirit of the Act and the
guidelines established by the Council on Environmental Quality for
preparation of impact statements.88
One evident reason that no foreign nation has adopted NEPA-type
constraints on governmental decision making is that none is willing to
allow individual citizens or groups the right to challenge state actions
or to require environmental accountability from the government.8 9 In
the United States the dispute over whether an EIS is required is the
most frequently litigated issue between federal agencies and en-
vironmentalist groups seeking to enforce NEPA.9 0 Given these cir-
cumstances, the idea of an International Environmental Policy Act
(IEPA) cannot be regarded as attainable within any meaningful
future period. If a country is unwilling to account to its own citizens
for the consequences of its decisions, it is unrealistic to expect that
nation to be accountable to some amorphous international entity or
community or to surrender its sovereignty so that some judicial entity
may enforce international environmental requirements against it. The
dismal failure to date to achieve any enforceable or effective regime
of law to stop ocean dumping, to assure tanker safety, to protect
whales and other endangered species, or to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation does not encourage the belief that an international regime
of law regulating deep-sea mining environmental practices has any
near-tern prospect of success. Moreover, as indicated earlier, im-
position of a NEPA-type process on deep-sea mining is only part of
the regulation necessary to assure adequate environmental protec-
tion.9'
In the foreseeable future only a few nations will possess the capital
base and technology to participate in deep-sea mining. Thus there is
no pressing short-term need to evolve a regime of law that is recog-
nized and obeyed by all or even most nations. The prospect of resolu-
tion of this matter in the LOS Conference is minimal.92 Although
these efforts to arrive at a multilateral international regime of law for
88. For example, some 20 of 70 federal agencies as of March, 1976, had not
adopted NEPA regulatory guidelines that reflected the current CEQ guidelines
for the preparation of environmental impact statements. Id. at 5.
89. See, e.g., Rabie & Eckard, Locus Standi: The Administration's Shield and
the Environmentalist's Shackle, 9 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFRICA 141 (1976).
90. Over half of the 654 NEPA cases mentioned in note 89 supra involved the
issue of whether a federal agency was required to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement. CEQ ANALYSIS, supra note 59, at 31.
91. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
92. See note 1 supra.
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deep-sea mining should not cease, the United States and others pos-
sessing the requisite technology should continue to develop the pro-
posed mining projects and negotiate on a bilateral basis those environ-
mental practices to be enforced during these operations.
Achievement of a number of effective bilateral agreements probably
would facilitate and expedite the evolution of a comprehensive regime
of international environmental law. The bilateral approach has several
other virtues that should be noted. These negotiations are less likely
to be encumbered by the types of extraneous issues that have bemired
LOS negotiations. In addition, bilateral meetings would focus con-
siderable world visibility on the negotiating countries. Although
world public opinion traditionally has little influence on the conduct of
certain nations when negotiations involve critical world power rela-
tions, those countries may be more tractable with respect to environ-
mental questions. For example, considerable evidence indicates that
the Soviet Union has been influenced by domestic and foreign criticism
to recognize the need for environmental protection, at least in the
situation involving Lake Baykal.
93
Furthermore, bilateral negotiations are likely to produce environ-
mental regulations that are site-specific and responsive to the peculiar
ecological conditions within given mining blocks. Thus these meetings
would avoid the production of a list of meaningless generalities that
are of little value in explicit enforcement situations.
Finally, these negotiations will involve complex economic factors,
and the United States probably will have a stronger bargaining posi-
tion in a bilateral situation. The compliance with NEPA and other
federal legislation enacted during the previous decade has demon-
strated that this country's environmental reform is becoming in-
creasingly costly, and the ability of the economy to meet these de-
mands has become a major national issue2Y Moreover, other indus-
trialized nations that compete with the United States have not enacted
comparable environmental legislation to govern their own manufac-
turing activities.95 The resulting unequal environmental costs have
produced significant trade distortions. The import relief provisions of
93. P. PRYDE, CONSERVATION IN THE SOVIET UNION 21, 63-64 (1972).
94. For a discussion of capital formation problems related to environmental
costs see Whitney, Capital Formation Options to Finance Pollution Control, 3
COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 42 (1976).
95. Congress has recognized the gravity of this problem. The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 6, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 note (Supp. II
1972), provides:
(a) The Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with other inter-
ested Federal agencies and with representatives of industry and the
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the Trade Act of 1974 96 were structured in part to cope with this
problem. 91 Subsequently, the International Trade Commission has
recommended the imposition of import relief measures with respect
public, shall undertake immediately an investigation and study to
determine-
(1) the extent to which pollution abatement and control programs
will be imposed on, or voluntarily undertaken by, United States manu-
facturers in the near future and the probable short- and long-range
effects of the costs of such programs (computed to the greatest extent
practicable on an industry-by-industry basis) on (A) the production
costs of such domestic manufacturers, and (B) the market prices of
the goods produced by them;
(2) the probable extent to which pollution abatement and control
programs will be implemented in foreign industrial nations in the
near future and the extent to which the production costs (computed
to the greatest extent practicable on an industry-by-industry basis)
of foreign manufacturers will be affected by the costs of such pro-
grams;
(3) the probable competitive advantage which any article manu-
factured in a foreign nation will likely have in relation to a com-
parable article made in the United States if that foreign nation-
(A) does not require its manufacturers to implement
pollution abatement and control programs,
(B) requires a lesser degree of pollution abatement and
control in its programs, or
(C) in any way reimburses or otherwise subsidizes its
manufacturers for the costs of such program;
(4) alternative means by which any competitive advantage ac-
cruing to the products of any foreign nation as a result of any factor
described in paragraph (3) may be (A) accurately and quickly
determined, and (B) equalized, for example, by the imposition of a
surcharge or duty, on a foreign product in an amount necessary to
compensate for such advantage; and
(5) the impact, if any, which the imposition of a compensating
tariff or other equalizing measure may have in encouraging foreign
nations to implement pollution abatement and control programs.
(b) The Secretary shall make an initial report to the President and
Congress within six months after the date of enactment of this sec-
tion [Oct. 18, 1972] of the results of the study and investigation
carried out pursuant to this section and shall make additional reports
thereafter at such times as he deems appropriate taking into account
the development of relevant data, but not less than once every twelve
months.
96. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp. 1977).
97. See Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping With Unequal Environmental
Control Costs, 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 577, 592-605 (1975).
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to specialty steel,9 8 shoes,99 color television,0 0 honey, 10' mushrooms, 10 2
and sugar. 0 3
Consequently, in bilateral negotiations concerning deep-sea mining
regulations, if a nation rejects the adoption of a rule or practice
that the United States regards as essential to environmental protec-
tion and if that refusal produces unequal operational costs that result
in a trade distortion, this country's negotiators should indicate that
import relief against the advantaged foreign product can and will be
imposed. Thus another nation's incentive to avoid fully adequate en-
vironmental regulations for economic advantage might be reduced
significantly, and the United States would have considerable economic
leverage to support its negotiating stance.
CONCLUSION
Deep-sea mining of manganese nodules by American and foreign
firms is inevitable given the ever-increasing demand for industrial
elements. The requisite technological and economic resources are avail-
able; only a guaranteed security for corporate investment and effort is
lacking. Congress can and should enact a legislative program that
provides this assurance subject to compliance with sound regulatory
and environmental principles. Similarly, a concomitant effort to influ-
ence foreign countries through a series of bilateral negotiations and
agreements to adhere to sound environmental safeguards will advance
the goal of efficient, responsible exploitation of the natural resources
in the ocean's seabeds. Moreover, such bilateral agreements could
provide a basis for the emergence of favorable customary interna-
tional law that would promote the negotiation of a viable LOS agree-
ment.
98. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Report to the President on Investigation No.
TA-203-2 (Feb. 14, 1977).
99. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Report to the President on Investigation No.
TA-201-18 (Feb. 8, 1977).
100. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Report to the President on Investigation No.
TA-201-19 (Mar. 22, 1977).
101. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Report to the President on Investigation No.
TA-201-14 (June 29, 1976).
102. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Report to the President on Investigation No.
TA-201-17 (Jan. 10, 1977).
103. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Report to the President on Investigation No.
TA-201-16 (Mar. 17, 1977).
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